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ECONOMIC 
NOTES
It’s three years since the current recession 
hit Australia. No post-war econom ic 
downturn has been so severe or lasted so 
long.
Perhaps for this reason, but also because 
no-one likes to be too pessimistic, economic 
debate in Australia at the moment mainly 
consists o f pious wishes rather than 
hardh ead ed  a n a ly s is . P o lit ic ia n s , 
businessmen and economists are hard at 
work trying to talk the economy into a 
recovery but so far with little success. One 
reason, o f course, is that Australia is plugged 
into the still depressed world economy.
Econom ic debate in Australia has 
traditionally ignored this simple fact. It has 
been thought that keeping the economy 
humming is the main job of the government 
of the day; conversely, if anything goes 
d ra s tica lly  w ron g , it m ust be the 
government’s fault.
The Labor Opposition ran just such a line 
every time the economy faltered between 
1949 and 1972. In fact, they were so 
successful in convincing people o f this that 
when they eventually won office and had to 
handle Australia’s most serious economic 
downturn since the 1930s the voters knew 
exactly who to blame.
While it was in office, Labor pleaded that 
both aspects o f the recession - first soaring 
prices and then growing unemployment -
had international causes. But the excuse 
sounded lame, even to the Party’s own 
supporters.
If anything, last December’s election result 
shows that many voters still blame Labor for 
the recession. The Fraser government, for its 
part, is banking on the same psychology 
working in reverse when the recovery comes. 
So long as the government hangs on and 
sounds confident they’ll get the credit for the 
eventual recovery and govern till the end of 
the century with the continuing support of a 
thankful electorate.
At least that’s the strategy. It could come 
unstuck, of course, if there is no recovery 
internationally. This is why any survey o f 
Australia’s economic prospects and the 
political future we can expect must start with 
the international economy.
An Inside Story
The latest and most authoritative survey 
of the world capitalist economy from within, 
as it were, can be found in the Organisation 
fo r  E c o n o m ic  C o -o p e r a t io n  an d  
Development’s E conom ic O utlook  22, 
published in December last year.
“The pick-up in activity in late 1976 and 
early 1977 was short-lived” , the OECD 
points out in a survey o f developments since 
the recession. “ Total OECD growth 
weakened markedly in the second quarter of
1977 and has since remained sluggish.
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Industrial production has broadly stagnated 
since April. In the United States there has 
been some slowing down, and in Japan 
industrial output is flat.”
The immediate consequence: worsening 
unemployment. “Total unemployment in the 
area” , the Organisation reports, “ is now 
about 16.3 million, some half a million higher 
than the trough of the 1975 recession.
“ In Europe, unlike the united States, 
unemployment has in fact been rising 
constantly, from 4.7 million at the beginning 
o f 1975 to over 7 million today. In many 
countries the weakness of the labor market 
has led to an actual fall in employment and a 
rise in the under-utilisation o f employees.”
This year will make things worse, the 
OECD predicts, with unemployment at the 
end o f 1978 reaching 17 million.
The good news is that the inflationary 
surge that hit the capitalist world in the early 
1970s is now receding, though inflation is 
still running at twice to three times its pre­
recession rate.
Consumer prices in the OECD area rose at 
an annual rate o f 6 per cent in the four 
months to October - markedly better, as the 
Organisation points out, than the 11 percent 
registered earlier in 1977.
Unfortunately, food prices — partly for 
seasonal reasons — have been the most 
important factor contributing to the better 
performance o f most countries which means 
further cuts in inflation are not assured.
The problem, the OECD believes, goes 
back to weakening output. Inflation through
1978 should average 7 per cent, compared 
with 8 per cent over the whole of 1977 and 8 
per cent also in 1976. An improvement, 
perhaps, but hardly a dramatic one.
These present forecasts, the OECD warns, 
“ assume no marked deterioration in 
business or consumer confidence, and this 
might be optimistic for most countries in 
view o f the current weakness in both 
domestic demand and foreign trade” .
‘A particular source of risk’
“ Demand trends are weak almost 
everywhere, In the absence o f new policy 
action, therefore, there could be an important 
downside risk in the forecast. A particular
source o f risk is the possibility that the 
pattern of international payments which 
seems implicit in the demand and output 
prospects would not, in fact, prove 
supportable.”
This is a very careful way o f saying that 
the world monetary system faces a new crisis 
that is at least as serious as the one that set 
off the last bout of inflation.
Again, the culprit is the American dollar.
Since much o f the world’s trade is done in 
US dollars and since many countries hold 
their foreign reserves in American currency, 
everyone has a stake in the health o f the 
dollar. And right now, it is looking pretty 
sick.
The irony is that the United States was the 
only capitalist country to significantly 
expand production last year, but it was just 
such an expansion that set o ff the dollar 
crisis.
When the US economy picked up and 
unemployment fell slightly from 7.8 per cent 
to 7.0 per cent, Americans began buying 
again. Imports soared, swollen by a $45 
billion oil bill. However, other countries, with 
thousands o f their own workers still 
unemployed, refused to buy American 
exports.
The US last year spent $30 billion more on 
imports than it earnt by exporting. The $30 
billion, of course, ended up overseas, swelling 
the already massive pool of US dollars held 
by foreigners to an awesome $300 billion. 
Naturally, the dollar’s value began to slide, 
falling,for example, 12 per cent against the 
Deutschmark over the year.
‘A fully-fledged depression’
Non-Americans holding dollars began to 
get nervous. “The fall ofthe dollar” , warned 
editor Theo Sommer o f the leading West 
German daily D ie Zeit, “ if unchecked, 
would plunge Europe into a fully-fledged 
depression. The political dislocations in 
countries like France would be grave.
“ Such a failure would quickly turn a 
monetary crisis into a crisis of confidence 
that will shake the foundations of the 
Western system.”
While this may sound exaggerated it 
certainly highlights a real problem other
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■ countries haven’t learnt to deal with. After 
all, the last time the world was flooded with 
US dollars was during the Viet Nam war. 
America wanted to finance its unpopular 
military adventures without raising taxes. 
Instead, it printed dollars and pumped them 
into the world monetary system, setting off 
an unprecedented inflation. All currencies 
were affected, including A ustralia ’s. 
Everyone paid for America’s war.
Now a similar thing is happening. As US 
dollars flood the world and drop in value, it 
becomes easier for the US to sell its exports 
overseas - and harder for other countries to 
sell in the US. Thus, the US is actually better 
off, which is why President Carter has held 
off so long before intervening to support the 
dollar.
It was only very strong international 
pressure that forced Washington to start 
buying up dollars with its own foreign 
currency reserves and so stem the slide in the 
dollar’s value.
At the same time, the US Federal Reserve 
Board raised the interest rate it charges 
member banks by half a per cent to 
encourage all US rates upwards and so 
attract more capital from abroad.
These moves were lauded in Western 
Europe but clearly will check American 
domestic economic growth. For example, the 
“ prime” bank rate on business loans is now 8 
per cent compared with 6 Vi per cent at the 
beginning of last year, and Wall Street 
predicts it will go to 9% or even 9 per cent by 
the end of 1978, according to Tim e, January 
30.
“The rise makes it more expensive for 
consumers and businesses to buy or build 
with borrowed cash” , Tim e explains. “ It 
could put an end to the housing boom by 
causing savers to pull their money out of 
savings banks — the prime source of 
mortgage loans — and instead buy Treasury 
bills or bonds to get the higher interest rates 
that they offer.”
US domestic inflation is now picking up 
again, averaging 7.25 per cent over the last 
four months o f last year. While this may 
sound good by Australian standards, it, in 
fact, represents a serious reverse: inflation in 
the US is now higher than it was two years 
ago and is predicted to go higher still. It
seems that even the most powerful economy 
in the world cannot begin to recover without 
setting off new inflationary pressures that 
must, by the nature of things, flow through to 
other, dependent economies.
Another source of instability
While US domestic developments are one 
source of instability for the international 
monetary system, another, perhaps more 
intractable, problem involves the under­
developed countries.
According to the OECD those developing 
countries which import oil saw their overseas 
debt rise from $90 billion at the end of 1973 to 
$170 billion at the end of 1976. At the same 
time, the interest they had to pay on these 
loans went from $13 billion each year to over 
$25 billion. US Senator Javits predicts these 
debts will reach $380 billion in five years and 
$540 billion in ten years.
“This will break the back of any system, 
including this system” , Senator Javits said, 
referring to the institutions that regulate 
international finance.
While the under-developed countries are 
more and more heavily in debt to other 
countries and to international agencies, the 
really dramatic growth has been in their 
debts to international banks.
As the OECD puts it: “ The international 
banking community has so far shown a 
remarkable willingness and ability to act as 
financial intermediary between the 
surpluses o f  the petroleum exporting 
countries and the borrowing needs o f the 
developing (and some developed) countries.”
These oil surpluses — currently running at 
about $40 billion a year — are the amounts 
the oil producing countries receive for their 
oil over and above what they are able to 
spend on imports. Due to their small 
populations and backward social systems, 
these countries only import a limited 
quantity of goods. The rest of the money they 
make out of oil is merely deposited in US and 
European private banks.
This money is then re-lent. Because of the 
world recession, the banks’ main customers, 
the big corporations, have not needed funds 
for expansion. The banks, therefore, have 
been falling over themselves to lend their 
surpluses to other borrowers and in
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particular to non-oil producing under­
developed countries who desperately need 
funds to pay for imports — especially oil, for 
which they, too, have to pay higher prices.
Thus, while commercial and industrial 
loans of the eight largest New York banks 
increased only 1,8 per cent to $33.8 billion 
during the year to June 1977, foreign lending 
jumped 26.1 per cent to $71.2 billion in the 
same period.
In 1960, private “ hard”  loans - in other 
words, loans at market rates o f interest to 
private banks - made up only 16.7 per cent of 
the debt of developing countries. Now the 
proportion is 36.2 per cent. Interest payable 
to private banks has gone up even faster, 
now constituting 42,8 per cent of these 
countries’ massive debt service charges.
For many o f them, interest payments take 
over a quarter o f all export earnings and for 
some much more: Brazil, for example, will 
have to spend 44 per cent o f all its export 
earnings this year, just to pay interest on its 
debts.
The private multinational banks, of 
course, are in it for the money. While the 
proportion of their total funds that they lend 
to under-developed countries varies between 
Chase M anhattan’s 12 per cent and 
Citicorp’s 22 per cent, the proportion of their 
profits which they derive from this source is 
much greater. Foreign earnings o f the 
thirteen US com m ercial banks have 
increased from 34 per cent o f total earnings 
in 1973 to nearly 50 per cent in 1975. Later 
figures are no doubt higher.
But how long can it go on?
A study by American Express says that 
one out o f every two dollars borrowed by the 
under-developed countries in 1980 will have 
to be spent just paying interest on old loans. 
A US Senate study on “ International Debt, 
the Banks and US Foreign Policy” predicts 
that these countries “ will find it more in their 
interest to simply default or repudiate their 
external debts rather than to have to 
continue borrowing just to repay old loans” .
“ And if this happens” , the study goes on, 
“a domino effect could take place in which 
other debtor countries follow suit, the banks 
panic and start calling in their international 
loans, the stock market falls precipitously 
and the international capital market 
collapses.
“This doomsday scenario may be extreme 
in its pessimism, but it is being taken 
seriously enough by responsible officials 
that a concerted international effort is now 
under way to prevent that first domino from 
falling.”
Part of this “ international effort” consists 
of forcing under-developed countries 
borrowing from private banks to fulfill the 
sorts o f  s tr in g en t co n d it io n s  the 
International Monetary Fund lays down 
before it will give official loans.
The IMF has been able to force recipient 
countries to cut back social services, hold 
down living standards and impose other 
austerity measures as conditions for official 
loans. As the OECD points out, one reason 
under-developed countries prefer private 
loans even before they have exhausted their 
credit facilities with the IMF is that the 
banks up till now haven’t imposed such 
conditions.
But this has to change, the OECD argues: 
“ Debt relief should be accompanied by an 
effective stabilisation program on the part of 
the debtor country, preferably in the context 
o f an IMF standby undertaking.” In other 
words, the IMF will bail out the private 
banks if the banks in turn impose the same 
austerity measures as conditions for future 
loans.
The banks, however, are caught in a trap. 
If they reverse their liberal, profit-hungry 
criteria for future loans they might trigger off 
a series o f defaults. Once this has happened 
where will it end? Better, perhaps, to keep 
lending. '
This instability in the international 
monetary system has persisted through the 
recession and could well upset any recovery 
in world production or trade. The US 
experience suggests any upturn will be at the 
cost of future inflation. If this inflation is 
immediately transmitted through the 
system, future prospects for places like 
Australia are not nearly as bright as our own 
recent inflation history suggests.
We may, in fact, be taken for another 
inflation ride before we recover from the 
present one.
T. O’S., 8.2.78.
